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FT Coverage and UK Target Price Run-ups 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We focus on the explanation of the increase in share prices and trading volume of 
target firms before their merger announcements that have conventionally been attributed to 
either insider trading or market expectation. We use FT coverage as a proxy of merger 
expectation and search for relevant articles for 783 UK target firms between 1998 and 2010. 
We identify a total of 1,049 rumour articles and find that the FT market expectation proxy 
explains a small percentage of the target price run-ups. Results are strong during the sample 
period, even though the magnitude for both returns and trading volume tends to decrease 
within recent years. There is also a strong contemporaneous relation between abnormal 
returns and trading volume. Unexplained increases in target prices and trading volume may 
therefore be attributed to insider trading.       
Keywords: Mergers and acquisitions, target firms, target price run-ups, media coverage   
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1. Introduction 
The media often report the increase in targets’ share prices before their merger 
announcements as an indication of insider activity (e.g., Morgenson, 27/08/2006). Pretzlik 
(10/11/1999, p.32) reports in the Financial Times (FT) that “The London Stock Exchange is 
examining dealings in Rugby Group... Shares in Rugby rose more than 16 per cent on Friday 
October 29, before RMC (Ready Mixed Concrete Group) approached it about a takeover on 
Sunday evening. Rugby said on Monday morning that it had received an approach, which 
was later disclosed as having come from RMC”. Academic studies (e.g., Mathur and 
Waheed, 1995; King, 2009) confirm that targets’ share prices increase weeks before their 
merger announcements, and a debate has arisen regarding the explanation of the target price 
run-ups pattern. Two hypotheses have been developed.  
According to the insider trading hypothesis (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981), insiders are 
aware of prospective mergers and buy shares of these firms to gain from the expected 
premium. Insiders may be corporate staff working at the target or bidding firm or even at the 
financial institution that organises the merger. Cornell and Sirri (1992) report that informed 
investors can identify and follow insiders’ transactions, generating the target price run-ups 
pattern. Meulbroek (1992) finds that almost half of the increase in targets’ share prices is 
experienced on days when insiders traded in the firms. Eyssell (1990) and Seyhun (1990) 
even report that trading volume increases in line with the information level of insiders.  
According to the market expectation hypothesis (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), investors 
predict the firms that will become targets before their merger announcements. Most studies 
use media coverage as a proxy of the market’s awareness of the M&A, with investors 
managing to predict target firms if rumours were published earlier. In line with the attention 
hypothesis, as developed by Barber and Odean (2008), individual investors base their 
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decisions on media coverage to identify firms for long transactions, due to the large selection 
of firms available. Early studies (e.g., Pound and Zeckhauser, 1990; Zivney et al., 1996) 
focus on the newspaper coverage of a particular column, such as the columns Heard on the 
Street and/or Abreast of the Market, and later studies consider articles within a newspaper, 
but, due to the difficulty of collecting data manually, limit their research to a short horizon of 
a limited number of target firms. Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) analyse 86 UK target firms 
from 1988 to 1989, Murray (1994) 60 Australian target firms from 1988 to 1992, and King 
(2009) 399 Canadian firms between 1985 and 2002.  
Most international studies show that press coverage partly explains the price run-ups 
of target firms, with the upwards reaction in target firms commencing days before the 
appearance of rumours. Gupta and Misra (1989) report that US target firms with rumours 
experience abnormal returns at 16 percent prior to merger announcements and 7 percent 
before rumours. Results remain robust when exploring the abnormal level of trading volume 
before rumours. Bris (2005) states that high trading volume in a firm is the first sign that 
illegal transactions may be made by insiders. Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) find that trading 
volume is higher before merger announcements, and Murray (1994) shows that the abnormal 
trading volume is 15 percent for firms with rumours. King (2009) uses Canadian mergers and 
finds that abnormal returns and trading volume prior to rumours are 6.42 and 2.82 percent.     
Existing UK results are mixed. Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) analyse 86 target 
firms from 1988 to 1989 and show that FT coverage explains a significant part of the target 
price run-ups, especially when considering that FT reflects the prior day’s news. The 
unexplained returns of target firms two days prior to rumours were insignificant at 0.28 
percent. However Siganos (2013) explores 430 target firms from 2004 to 2010, based on data 
availability from Google volume trends, and finds that the target price run-ups commences 
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before the market could have predicted such pattern, supporting the alternative insider 
hypothesis.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we explore the target price run-
ups prior to the merger announcement of 783 UK target firms between 1998 and 2010 and 
therefore, the data period coverage is longer and the number of firms and rumours analysed 
larger in relation to prior literature (see Appendix A). Since existing UK results are 
conflicting, our study intends to provide further evidence whether the target price run-ups is 
present in the London Stock Exchange using one of the most complete dataset in the 
literature. Second, the significant length of the data set used offers the opportunity to explore 
the robustness of the target price run-ups during the sample period and whether fines to 
insiders may impact on the magnitude of the target price run-ups. Third, our study is the first 
that incorporates trading volume to explore the UK target price run-ups. According to Bris 
(2005), trading volume is the first sign of a potential illegal transaction and its incorporation 
may offer further evidence of illegal transactions. We further explore the interrelation 
between returns and trading volume that may offer further evidence of potential insiders’ 
transactions.  
Fourth, due to regulatory and market differences with the US, studying the UK target 
price run-ups allows us to make inferences about the pattern, outside of the US. Studying the 
target price run-ups in the UK avoids the standard criticism that observed regularities in the 
US may be a function of data mining. The Takeover Panel, in collaboration with the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), has been responsible for administering, regulating and 
supervising the takeover rules since 1968. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Bris (2005) 
report that most UK prosecutions for insider trading tend to be less effective than those in the 
US, since defendants tend to settle without going to trial, and the fines issued to UK insiders 
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tend to be much lighter than those for US insiders. Since January 2002, prosecutions by the 
FSA have been published online,1 and we find that only a few of these fines were for insiders 
who traded illegally before merger announcements. Individuals were fined only in the 
mergers of IFeelGood plc in April/May 2003 and Monterrico plc in February 2007, and the 
charges were limited, ranging between £15,000 and £176,254. The illegal transactions were 
committed by a friend/a former colleague and the brother of an insider rather than directly by 
the insiders. Since 19th September 2011, the Takeover Panel has also implemented various 
amendments to the takeover code,2 showing awareness of limitations in recent legislation. A 
target firm needs to name any potential bidding firm with which it is in discussion or from 
which it has received an approach, and the potential bidding firm has up to 28 days to 
announce its intention to make an offer or not, or it will have to withdraw for the next six 
months. These changes have been made with the intention to offer transparency during 
merger negotiations by shortening the period of time target firms may be under discussion for 
a merger and by encouraging firms to focus only on genuine merger negotiations, thus 
avoiding leaks to the media. Overall, the UK regulator is aware of potential insider activity 
before mergers, and the overall UK framework shows signs that insiders may have been more 
likely to trade on their private information than their US counterparts. This generates an 
expectation of high pre-announcement returns for UK target firms. 
In line with our hypothesis, we find evidence of a strong upwards price pattern before 
UK merger announcements. We follow an event study analysis and find that FT coverage can 
only explain part of the abnormal returns of target firms’ share performance before merger 
announcements. FT coverage explains merely 27 percent of the target price run-ups in firms 
with prior rumours. Results remain robust when we estimate abnormal trading volume and 
                                                          
1 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/press/facts/fines (last accessed March 2014). 
2 http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/transitionalarrangements.pdf (last accessed 
March 2014). 
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are strong during the sample period, even though the magnitude for both returns and trading 
volume tends to decrease within recent years that may be explained by FSA’s fines on 
individuals. We further find that there is a strong contemporaneous relation between 
abnormal returns and trading volume, giving further evidence on potential illegal transactions 
prior to merger announcements. Although we only use FT coverage to proxy the market 
expectation hypothesis, unexplained upwards price and volume patterns may be attributed to 
insider trading.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the data and 
methodology used and Section 3 discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes. 
  
2. Data and methodology 
2.1 Methodology 
We follow an event study analysis to explore whether FT coverage explains the target price 
run-ups pattern. We estimate daily abnormal returns following the risk-adjusted returns based 
on the three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993).   
(1)             )ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiititFF HMLbSMBbRbaRAR +++−=                        
where tSMB  and tHML  reflect the size and book/market risk proxies. To estimate these 
factors, firms with negative book values and financial companies (ICBIC = 8,000) are 
excluded from the sample, and we rebalance portfolios each June. Eligible UK companies 
available from Datastream are independently ranked into three book/market portfolios (L-30, 
M-40 and H-30 percent) and two size portfolios (S and L, based on the median market 
values), and we construct six portfolios: LS, LL, MS, ML, HS and HL. The tSMB factor 
reflects the daily return difference on the average three small-sized portfolios (LS, MS and 
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HS) and the three large-sized portfolios (LL, ML and HL), and the tHML factor reflects the 
daily return difference between the average of the two high-book/market portfolios (HS and 
HL) and the two low-book/market portfolios (LS, LL). MtR  shows the market (FTSE All 
Share) excess return over the risk-free rate of return. iHMLiSMBiMi bbba ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  coefficients are 
estimated over the 150-day interval from -250 to -101 days.  
In line with Bris (2005) and King (2009), we estimate daily abnormal trading volume as 
follows: 
(2)               ATVit=TVit-( iVT +2 TViσ ) if iVT >2 TViσ  or 0 otherwise  
where  iVT and TViσ are the mean and standard deviation of a firm’s trading volume 
from -250 to -101 days before the merger announcement. The formation period is identical 
for both abnormal trading volume and return. Abnormal trading volume indicates that a firm 
has at least two standard deviations higher volume than normal. Abnormal trading volume is 
at minimum zero by construction.  
 
2.2  Merger data 
We use OneBanker to download information about UK target firms with at least a 50% level 
of acquisition between April 1998 and December 2010. We collect 1,173 target firms and 
their merger announcement dates, where eligible firms are those with available Datastream 
codes that are used to link OneBanker with Datastream. Datastream is employed to access 
targets’ daily share returns and trading volume.3 We require that firms have 60 days of share 
returns prior to the merger announcement dates (day 0), with at least one non-zero return and 
                                                          
3 We use the Total Return Index (RI datatype) that incorporates dividend payments in the estimation of returns. 
We use firm volume (VO) adjusted by the total number of outstanding shares (NOSH) to measure trading 
volume. 
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at least 50 percent of returns available between -250 and -61 days.4 Firms should also have at 
least 50 percent of trading volume data between -60 and 0 and at least 20 percent between -
250 and -61 days. The different data restriction rule that we follow is due to the limited data 
availability on volume.5 The interval between -60 and 0 is the target price run-ups period, and 
for that reason we follow stricter data restrictions. We exclude a few firms that had more than 
one merger within the same three-month pre-announcement period to eliminate bias. The 
final sample consists of 783 target firms. 
Table 1 shows the number of target firms available during the sample and across 
industries. We find that apart from a large number of mergers in the late 1990s, the 
distribution of mergers within the remaining years is relatively similar. In line with Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996), we find that there are merger waves within each industry. We estimate 
the maximum two-year cluster that explores the maximum two year concentration of mergers 
within each industry. We find that this percentage tends to be higher than that found in the 
total target sample (27 percent). For example, the two-year cluster is equal to 41 percent 
within the Consumer Goods industry, showing that 31 out of all 76 mergers in the industry 
took place within two years. Figure 1 shows the targets’ cumulative abnormal share returns 
prior to merger announcements. We find that the increase in target share prices commences 
around 60 days prior to the merger announcement, which sets our time horizon. Most studies 
in the target price run-ups field (e.g., Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994) restrict the target price 
run-ups to the previous -29 days, but studies within the wider M&A field (e.g., Franks and 
Harris, 1989) show that the increase in share prices commences earlier.  
[ please insert Table 1 here ] 
                                                          
4 Note that our firms are not dead and the requirement of at least one non-zero return prior to merger 
announcements aims to exclude a few highly illiquid firms that may bias results.     
5 No firms have volume data for all 250 days, and only 91 firms have all trading volume data between -60 and 0.  
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[ please insert Figure 1 here ] 
 
2.3 FT data 
We use NewsBank to access daily FT coverage of these 783 target firms since January 1998. 
NewsBank’s FT coverage restricted the sample to the post-1998 period; if a larger number of 
newspapers were to be included, we would have reduced the sample period further. We 
search for FT articles per target firm and a number of terms reflecting potential merger 
activity.6 We set the time span to three months before each merger announcement. The search 
is undertaken using the full text, rather than only headlines, to boost the number of relevant 
articles. Articles identified by NewsBank may not necessarily indicate rumours about the 
particular target firms, and we study the articles to ensure that they offer information about a 
potential merger.7 Appendix B shows an example of a rumour.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 show the descriptive statistics of FT articles found. Panel 1 of Table 
2 shows the number of firms with FT coverage. We first explore whether FT covered the 
merger within two days after the announcement date (as reported by OneBanker), and find 
that the merger announcements of 198 (25 percent) firms were not reported. This is to some 
extent in line with Fang and Peress (2009), who report that within the US, over 25/42 percent 
of NYSE/NASDAQ firms have no coverage. Fang and Peress (2009) find that market 
capitalisation is one of the key determinants of media coverage, with small-sized firms 
experiencing low, if any, coverage. We find that firms with no coverage of their merger 
                                                          
6 We employ the following terms: merg*, acqui*, target, takeover, rumour*, rumor*, buyout and bid*, where * 
indicates that the searched term should have the letters prior to the star, followed by any alternative ending.   
7 In 103 targets, more than 20 articles are identified as relevant by NewsBank; as an example, in the search for 
merger activity of ‘Enterprise’ on 19/02/2007, 745 articles are identified as relevant. The large number of 
articles concerning the particular firm is due to the firm’s name, with most articles irrelevant to rumours. To 
minimise the manual work required, we include the name of the bidding companies in the search.       
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announcements were small capitalisation firms, with an average size of merely £285 million.8 
Of the remaining 585 target firms, whose mergers were reported, 340 firms had rumours. 
Panel 2 of Table 2 shows how many rumours were reported per company. We find that most 
firms had a few articles available, and only 14 of the firms reported over 10 articles. Panel 3 
of Table 2 shows that out of the total of 1,049 rumours, the potential merger was reported in 
544 articles within the headline and in 505 within the text. Panel 4 of Table 2 shows the 
number of lines reported. The coverage was on average (median) 6 (4) lines, with 30 percent 
of the articles being merely one line in length.9 Table 3 shows how many days before the 
announcement these articles were reported, with most rumours appearing a few days before. 
As an example, 35 percent of rumours were reported within 10 days before the 
announcement, though there are rumours even 70 days before. Table 4 shows the distribution 
of rumours across years and industries. In line with Table 1, which explores the distribution 
of target firms, we find that apart from a large number of rumours in the late 1990s, the 
distribution of rumours is relatively similar across years. With the exception of oil and gas 
and technology firms that experience an increase in rumours in the late 2000s, there is a 
larger number of rumours in the late 1990s across the remaining industries. The correlation 
between the annual number of target firms and that of rumour articles is 0.85. The maximum 
two-year cluster in the number of rumours within each industry is higher than that found in 
target firms. The average clustering in target firms is 32 percent (Table 1) and that of rumours 
is 40 percent.  
[ please insert Tables 2, 3 and 4 here ] 
                                                          
8 The average market capitalisation of firms with a reported merger announcement is £356 million, and for those 
firms with rumours, £881 million.  
9 As an example of a short rumour, Hume and Orr (20/03/2007, p.40) report that “George Wimpey rose 3.4 per 
cent to 584p on vague bid rumours. Traders suggested that it could tie the knot with Taylor Woodrow, a rival, 
up 2.8 per cent to 410 1/4p”. George Wimpey plc was acquired by Taylor Woodrow plc on 26/03/2007.  
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We also explore the impact of rumours on abnormal returns and trading volume in 
excess of the average return and trading volume in days without any coverage. Table 5 shows 
that the average abnormal returns and trading volume of firms on the publication day of 
rumours is 0.79 and 0.50 percent. Abnormal values are significant at the 1 percent level. This 
result is to some extent in line with Clarkson et al. (2006) and Chou et al. (2010), who use 
internet discussion sites to identify rumours for potential target firms and show that rumours 
have an impact on targets’ share returns. We explore whether the impact of rumours on 
returns and volume is different based on the sequence of appearance. We find that abnormal 
returns and trading volume at the time the first rumour appears are 1.32 and 0.48 percent. In 
line to some extent with the stale news hypothesis, as developed by Tetlock (2011), rumours 
that contain similar information and are reported on a later day have less of a positive impact.      
[ please insert Table 5 here ] 
Overall, we report that the target price run-ups effect commences around 60 days 
before the merger announcement, and that a large number of rumours before the merger 
announcement have an impact on firm share returns and trading volume. Later, we will 
explore whether these rumours explain the target price run-ups pattern.  
 
3. Empirical results 
3.1 Abnormal returns  
We now estimate abnormal returns of target firms before their merger announcement to 
explore whether or not these returns can be explained by rumours. We present the daily 
abnormal returns until two days prior to the merger announcement and the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) every ten days over the previous 60 days, when day 0 reflects the 
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merger announcement date. Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) hypothesise that news coverage 
reflects the previous day’s news, and we explore the lag between the coverage of news 
reported in a newspaper and the earlier time at which this information was available to 
market participants by estimating CAR(-60,-2).  
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the abnormal returns for the full sample of 783 target 
firms. We find that abnormal returns are positive, with the rate of the magnitude of abnormal 
returns becoming higher as the announcement day approaches. We find that CAR(-60,-1), 
which shows the cumulative returns between -60 and -1 days prior to the merger 
announcement, is 13.91 percent, and these returns are significant at the 1 percent level. In 
unreported results, we find that the returns of target firms are positive for all 32 days before 
their announcement. The magnitude of these returns is strong in comparison to that found in 
international studies. King (2009) and Gupta and Misra (1989) for example report that 
Canadian and US target firms experienced CARs at a magnitude of around 6 and 12 percent. 
As discussed earlier, insiders may be more likely to trade on their private information within 
the UK context.   
[ please insert Table 6 here ] 
We present results separately for the 340 firms with rumours (Columns 3 and 4 of 
Table 6), the 245 firms with FT coverage of their merger announcements (Column 5 of Table 
6) and the remaining 198 firms without any FT coverage (Column 6 of Table 6). These 
subsamples comprise the full sample of 783 firms. Firms with rumours have the highest 
target price run-ups (-60,-1), at 16.09 percent, in comparison to firms with FT coverage of 
their announcement (12.89) and firms without any FT coverage (11.43 percent). Firms with 
FT coverage of the merger announcement have the strongest share price reaction at the time 
of the announcement, at 15.14, versus 8.52 and 10.10 percent in firms with rumours and in 
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firms without any FT coverage. These results show that firms with rumours experience larger 
upwards pressure. However, rumours cannot explain the target price run-ups pattern, since 
the price pattern for firms without any FT coverage is still upwards before the merger.  
We explore whether these abnormal returns may be explained by FT coverage prior to 
the merger announcements. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 6 show the abnormal returns in 
relation to the first rumour or merger announcement date, with day 0 reflecting either the day 
that the first rumour was reported or the merger announcement date, for firms without 
rumours. In order for FT coverage to explain the upwards trend in target share prices, returns 
before rumours should become insignificant. We find that CAR(-60,-1) and CAR(-60,-2) for 
target firms are 13.00  and 7.70 percent, and corresponding returns for firms with rumours are 
11.69 and 2.93 percent. These returns are significant at least at the 5 percent level, showing 
that the increase in share prices commences before rumours appear.  
Figure 2 further shows the abnormal average daily returns in the interval between -60 
and -1 during the sample period. Returns shown are those unexplained from FT rumours. We 
find that abnormal returns are strong during the sample period, even though there is the 
tendency the magnitude of returns to decrease within recent years. Such reduction may be 
explained by the FSA fining individuals for insider trading prior to the IFeelGood plc merger 
during April-May 2003.10 Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) report that prosecution, rather than 
the passing of a law, has an impact on investor behaviour.   
  [ please insert Figure 2 here ] 
Overall, we support the market expectation hypothesis, showing that the target price 
run-ups pattern is related with FT coverage. However, it remains a considerable unexplained 
return. Results are robust during the sample period.  
                                                          
10 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Communication/PR/2004/107.shtml (last accessed March 2014). 
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3.2 Abnormal trading volume 
We also explore the abnormal trading volume before merger announcements. Table 7 shows 
the results. We find that abnormal trading volume is positive, with the rate of the magnitude 
of volume becoming higher as the merger announcement approaches. CATV(-60,-1) 
(cumulative abnormal trading volume) in the full sample of target firms is 5.29 percent and 
significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of abnormal volume is strong in comparison 
to that reported in international studies that followed a similar methodology to measure 
abnormal volume. King (2009) for example shows that the abnormal trading volume is 2.82 
percent in Canadian target firms.  
[ please insert Table 7 here ] 
Firms with rumours have the highest abnormal trading volume in the interval between 
-60 and -1, at 6.56 percent, and firms with FT coverage of the merger announcement have the 
strongest abnormal trading volume on the merger announcement day. These results show that 
rumours have an impact on the magnitude of the abnormal trading volume. We also explore 
whether this abnormal volume can be explained by rumours. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 7 
show the abnormal volume in relation to the first rumour or merger announcement date, 
whichever is earliest. We find that CATV(-60,-1) and CATV(-60,-2) for firms are 4.45 and 
3.73 percent, showing that rumours can explain part of the abnormal volume. The increase in 
volume commences before the rumour is made public. Figure 3 further shows the abnormal 
daily trading volume in the interval between -60 and -1 on the duration of the sample period. 
Volume shown is that unexplained from FT. We find that there are strong abnormal volume 
during the sample period and the magnitude of such abnormality tends to decrease within 
recent years.  
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[ please insert Figure 3 here ] 
  Overall, we find evidence supporting the market expectation hypothesis, showing 
that abnormal trading volume is related with news coverage. However, FT coverage can only 
explain part of the abnormal volume, showing the robustness of conclusions within both 
returns and trading volume.     
 
3.3 Robustness tests 
We undertake a number of robustness tests. Panel 1 of Table 8 explores the robustness of the 
abnormal returns that cannot be explained by rumours. For brevity, we only show cumulative 
abnormal returns for the (-60,-1) and (-60,-2) interval periods, for the full sample of firms. 
We first estimate abnormal returns in excess of contemporaneous market return ( itRmARadj. ) 
and after adjusting for risk based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model ( itCAPMARadj. ). We find 
that the magnitude of abnormal returns remains significantly positive prior to merger 
announcements within alternative abnormal return estimations. For example, the unexplained 
cumulative returns in the (-60,-2) interval period are 9.97 percent, and significant at the 1 
percent level, after adjusting for risk based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model. Note that the 
corresponding unexplained returns after adjusting for the three-factor model are 7.70 percent 
(as shown at Table 6).    
[ please insert Table 8 here ] 
We further exclude the five percent of the firms with the highest abnormal return prior 
to merger announcements and re-estimate abnormal returns. This test explores whether a few 
extreme return observations generate the target price run-ups. We find that after excluding 
these extreme observations as shown in the “sensitivity” column, the unexplained abnormal 
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returns may reduce by construction at 3.79 percent in the interval period between -60 and -2. 
However these returns remain significantly positive, indicating that our results are not driven 
by outliers.  
We even undertake a non-parametric test, in addition to counterpart parametric 
approach followed above. We use the sign test11 and find that there is a larger number of 
positive returns than would be present by chance. In line with Jaffe (1974) and Mandelker 
(1974), we also follow the portfolio method to deal with uncertainty in variances across 
firms. For every month, we estimate the average abnormal returns adjusted by prior month’s 
standard deviation. We then calculate the average of the cumulative standardised values. As 
shown at the portfolio method column, we find that the alternative estimation shows the 
presence of abnormal increases in returns prior to merger announcements.    
We also explore whether the target price run-ups is driven by any particular industry. 
We find that with the exception of telecommunications, the target price run-ups is present 
within the remaining industries. There are only 10 telecommunication firms available in our 
sample that may explain the weak pattern in the particular industry. In unreported results, we 
further estimate firms’ abnormal returns above their corresponding contemporaneous industry 
returns and find that the magnitude of the abnormal returns prior to merger announcements 
remains significantly positive.    
Panel 2 of Table 8 further explores the robustness in the increase of the abnormal 
trading volume prior to merger announcements that cannot be explained by rumours. We first 
estimate abnormal trading volume based on an alternative measure according to which we 
divide each firm’s abnormal trading volume by the standard deviation of its trading volume 
between -250 and -101 days ( ditSATVAdj tan. ). We find that the magnitude of the unexplained 
                                                          
11 J1=(N+/N-0.5)*N1/2/0.5 where N+ is the number of returns with positive abnormal returns and N the total 
number of available returns.  
18 
 
trading volume remains similar within alternative volume definitions. We further explore the 
level of abnormal trading volume prior to merger announcements when excluding the top 5 
percent firms with the highest increase in trading volume. Once again results show that 
outliers do not drive the increase in trading volume before merger announcements. After 
excluding the particular firms, there is still a clear upward trend in abnormal trading volume 
before merger announcements. We further show that the pattern is not driven by any 
particular industry, since we find a significant increase in abnormal trading volumes prior to 
merger announcements across industries.   
Overall, we find that the abnormal increase in returns and trading volume prior to 
merger announcements is robust within alternative specifications.                              
 
3.4 Interaction between abnormal returns and trading volume 
We also explore the interaction between abnormal returns and trading volume. As 
hypothesised by King (2009), a contemporaneous relation between returns and trading 
volume indicates potential insider trading, since insiders’ transactions determine both returns 
and trading volume. Meulbroek (1992) finds that a large part of the target price run-ups occur 
on days when insiders trade in the firms, and even though insiders’ transactions are small, the 
overall volume on those particular days increases. Theoretical propositions developed by 
Kyle (1985) are in agreement with these empirical results.   
We first explore a single equation relation between abnormal returns and trading volume 
by estimating a Panel regression with fixed effects, random effects and the first difference 
method. The alternative methods test the robustness of our results. Panel 1 of Table 9 shows 
the results within (-60,-1) and (-100,-61) intervals. We use the (-100,-61) interval period as a 
control period. We find that the relation between abnormal trading volume and returns during 
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the (-60,-1) period is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, showing that there is a 
strong contemporaneous relation between returns and volume that indicates insiders’ 
transactions. In particular, the parameter coefficient is 0.652, 0.626 and 0.576 when using 
fixed effects, random effects and the first difference method. During the (-100,-61) period, 
there may be a positive relation between returns and volume, but the coefficient is at a lower 
magnitude than that found in the target price run-ups period (0.383, 0.368 and 0.241 when 
using fixed effects, random effects and the first difference method). The relation between 
returns and volume in the control period is at most significant at the 10 percent level.    
[ please insert Table 9 here ] 
Panel 2 of Table 9 undertakes a multivariate analysis. We estimate the following Panel 
estimation only with fixed effects, since the Hausman test is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level:  
(3)        ititititiititFF uBMbSizebATVRumourbATVbbAR +++++= 432103 ln*  
where 3itFFAR  is the three-factor risk-adjusted returns as estimated in equation (1), itATV  
is the abnormal trading volume as estimated by equation (2), iRumour  is a dummy variable 
coded 1 for firms with rumours, itLnSize is the log market capitalisation and itBM  is the 
book-to-market. We find that the coefficient on iti ATVRumour *  is positive within the (-60,-
1) interval, showing that the relation between returns and trading volume is stronger within 
firms with rumours. This result may indicate that insiders leak their private information to the 
media to boost the target price run-ups pattern. We also find that the target price run-up is 
higher within large capitalisation value firms. The relations between returns and size, and 
returns and book-to-market are present during the control period (-100,-61). Therefore, the 
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particular results need to be interpreted with caution. In unreported results, we find that prior 
relations hold robust when estimating equation (3) within (-60,-2).    
Overall, we find a positive relation between contemporaneous abnormal returns and 
trading volume during the target price run-ups period, offering further support of potential 
insider transactions within the UK market. The relation between returns and trading volume 
is stronger within firms that had a rumour.   
 
4. Conclusion 
Studies (e.g., Mathur and Waheed, 1995) find that the share prices of target firms increase 
before their merger announcements, and two hypotheses are developed to explain the price 
pattern. According to the insider trading hypothesis (Keown and Pinkerton, 1981), insiders 
trade in these firms before the announcement whereas according to the market expectation 
hypothesis (Jensen and Ruback, 1983), investors manage to predict the target firms before 
their merger announcements. We focus on the market expectation hypothesis by exploring FT 
coverage, with investors predicting target firms as long as rumours were reported.  
  In line with the UK context that shows signs of strong insider transactions, we find 
that there are strong high pre-announcement returns for UK target firms. We identify 1,049 
rumours published in FT and find that these rumours have an impact on share returns and 
trading volume on the publication day. We follow an event study analysis and conclude that 
FT coverage explains part of the abnormal returns and trading volume. Results remain robust 
during the sample period, even though there is the tendency the abnormal returns and trading 
volume to decrease within recent years that may be explained by FSA fining individuals for 
insider trading. We also find that there is a contemporaneous relation between returns and 
trading volume, indicating further evidence of potential illegal transactions. We only use FT 
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coverage to proxy the market expectation hypothesis, but insider trading may contribute to 
the unexplained increase in returns and trading volume.  
Future research may explore further proxies of the market expectation hypothesis. 
Toeholds may for example be used as an alternative merger signals according to which 
bidding firms acquire shares of the target before the merger announcement. Due to the lack of 
access in toehold data, we did not test the particular hypothesis.      
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Appendix A. Media coverage in the target price run-ups literature 
Study Period Country # of firms  # of rumours 
Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) 1988-1989 UK 86 54 
Siganos (2013) 2004-2010 UK 430 127 
     
Chou et al. (2010) 1990-2008 US 260 n/a 
Gao and Oler (2012) 1990-2001 US 976 n/a 
Gupta and Misra (1989) 1985-1986 US 87 83 
Hallett (2007) 2003-2006 US 431 431 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) 1981-1985 US 172 69 
Mathur and Waheed (1995) 1981-1989 US 233 n/a 
Pound and Zeckhauser (1990) 1983-1985 US 42 42 
Zivney et al. (1996) 1985-1988 US 271 871 
     
Aspris et al. (2014) 2001-2009 Australia 450 n/a 
Clarkson et al. (2006) 1999-2000 Australia 118 189 
Murray (1994) 1988-1992 Australia 60 n/a 
     
King (2009) 1985-2002 Canada 399 99 
Notes: # shows the number of target firms and the number of rumours analysed.  
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Appendix B. An example of a rumour article 
 
Deutsche Bahn bid talk drives Arriva higher  
Bid speculation made Arriva the main talking point on Tuesday as the London market edged 
higher. Shares in the transport group rose 2.1 per cent to 579½p, the highest in more than a 
year, amid rumours that Deutsche Bahn was eyeing an offer. The state-owned German group 
was rumoured to be in preliminary talks about a bid, with new chief executive Rüdiger Grube 
keen to expand outside the company's home market. Both companies declined to comment. 
Analysts said the combination made strategic sense, as it would bring together Deutsche 
Bahn's expertise in high-speed rail with Arriva's Europe-wide bus and train franchises. 
Financing for any deal, probably to be about £1.5bn, was unlikely to present a problem, they 
said. However, it was not clear where a deal for Arriva would fit into the German 
government's controversial and politically sensitive moves to privatise Deutsche Bahn. Local 
elections in May could make the timing difficult, dealers said.   
Elder and Hume (16/03/2010)  
 
Notes: Arriva plc was acquired by Deutsche Bahn AG on 18/03/2010. 
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Table 1. Distribution of target firms across years and industries 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total industry Max cluster % in 2 years 
Basic material 1 7 8 2 2 0 1 2 3 6 4 7 2 45 33 
Consumer goods 6 20 11 8 2 4 4 7 4 6 1 1 2 76 41 
Consumer services 14 28 19 10 16 14 7 17 21 13 5 7 4 175 27 
Financials 11 16 21 11 7 2 3 8 6 10 8 7 3 113 33 
Health care 3 7 4 2 1 4 4 1 6 8 5 7 2 54 26 
Industrials 13 28 20 12 5 4 7 24 10 23 9 7 9 171 28 
Oil and gas 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 4 0 6 4 2 3 25 40 
Technology 0 12 5 5 12 4 4 9 10 15 15 4 5 100 30 
Telecommunications 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 1 10 30 
Utilities 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 2 14 36 
                
Annual total 50 120 91 51 49 33 31 76 64 88 54 43 33  27 
% of total 6 15 12 7 6 4 4 10 8 11 7 5 4   
Notes: This table shows the distribution of target firms across years and industries. We use OneBanker to download UK target firms with at least a 50 percent level of 
acquisition between April 1998 and December 2010. ‘Max cluster % in 2 years’ shows the two years with the maximum number of firms available adjusted by the total 
number of target firms per industry.  
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Table 2. FT coverage 
 # 
Panel 1: Firms with FT coverage 
No coverage of the merger 198 
With coverage of the merger 585 
With rumour articles 340 
Panel 2: Firms’ coverage with rumours 
1 article 129 
2 articles 72 
3 articles 44 
4 articles 26 
5 articles 23 
6 articles 13 
7 articles 9 
8 articles 4 
9 articles 4 
10 articles 2 
0ver 10 articles 14 
Total articles with rumours 1049 
Panel 3: Articles with relevant headline 
Yes 544 
No 505 
Panel 4: Lines of articles 
Average 6 
0.10 1 
0.20 1 
0.30 1 
0.40 2 
0.50 4 
0.60 7 
0.70 10 
0.80 12 
0.90 14 
Notes: Panel 1 shows the number (#) of firms with FT coverage of the merger announcement and firms with FT 
coverage articles prior to the merger announcement. Panel 2 shows how frequently articles appeared about these 
firms. Panel 3 shows whether the relevance of the articles regarding potential merger activity is cited on the 
headline or within the text and Panel 4 describes the number of lines reported in FT.   
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Table 3. FT coverage before the merger announcement date 
Day # % Cumulative (%) 
-1 72 7 7 
-2 48 5 11 
-3 47 4 16 
-4 31 3 19 
-5 33 3 22 
-6 28 3 25 
-7 45 4 29 
-8 32 3 32 
-9 21 2 34 
-10 15 1 35 
    
(-10,-1) 372 35 35 
(-20,-11) 218 21 56 
(-30,-21) 162 15 72 
(-40,-31) 110 10 82 
(-50,-41) 94 9 91 
(-60,-51) 72 7 98 
(-70,-61) 21 2 100 
Notes: This table shows when FT articles appeared in relation to the announcement date (day 0).  # shows the 
number of articles. 
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Table 4. Distribution of rumour articles across years and industries 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total industry Max cluster % in 2 years 
Basic material 0 1 18 6 1 0 0 0 24 5 1 2 0 58 50 
Consumer goods 5 44 12 25 2 1 7 11 0 10 0 0 0 117 48 
Consumer services 32 67 24 12 23 62 8 41 37 11 2 1 3 323 31 
Financials 1 18 26 9 12 1 2 0 7 8 1 6 2 93 47 
Health care 0 9 11 5 0 8 3 0 1 5 13 8 1 64 33 
Industrials 19 33 17 13 1 18 14 29 12 17 20 1 7 201 26 
Oil and gas 2 3 1 0 4 1 2 6 0 2 18 13 8 60 52 
Technology 0 12 12 4 8 3 0 2 15 13 17 5 6 97 31 
Telecommunications 0 1 0 0 4 0 0 4 1 0 2 0 0 12 42 
Utilities 1 0 10 0 4 0 0 1 5 3 0 0 0 24 42 
                
Annual total 60 188 131 74 59 94 36 94 102 74 74 36 27  30 
% of total 6 18 12 7 6 9 3 9 10 7 7 3 3   
Notes: This table shows the distribution of rumour articles across years and industries. ‘Max cluster % in 2 years’ shows the two years with the maximum number of rumours 
available adjusted by the total number of rumours per industry.  
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Table 5. Impact of FT articles on abnormal returns and trading volume (%) 
 
3itFFAR  #  itATV  # 
1st rumour 1.32*** 340  0.48*** 330 
2nd rumour 0.92* 179  0.70*** 175 
3rd rumour 0.69 108  0.62** 102 
4th rumour 0.00 75  0.10 70 
5th rumour -0.43 44  0.12 42 
6th rumour 0.32 25  0.44* 25 
7th rumour -1.27* 17  0.72 17 
8th rumour -1.07 12  0.30 11 
9th rumour 0.23 7  0.28 6 
10th rumour -0.70 2  0.12 1 
11th rumour -0.16 1  n/a 0 
All rumours 0.79*** 810  0.50*** 779 
Notes: This table shows the impact of FT articles on targets’ abnormal share returns ( 3itFFAR ) and abnormal trading volume ( itATV ) on the day of the coverage. Rumours 
are ranked based on the sequence of their appearance in FT. Abnormal returns and trading volume are in excess of the average return and trading volume in days without any 
coverage. The significance levels indicate the average excess return/trading volume, above days without rumours, over all the firms with a rumour (e.g., 1st rumour) adjusted 
by the corresponding standard error and the number of observations. # shows the number of observations available. 3itFFAR is estimated as follows: 
)ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiititFF HMLbSMBbRbaRAR +++−= where tSMB  and tHML  reflect the size and book/market risk proxies and iHMLiSMBiMi bbba
ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  
coefficients are estimated over the 150-day interval from -250 to -101 days. itATV  is estimated as follows: ATVit=TVit-( VT i+2 TViσ ) if VT i>2 TViσ  or 0 otherwise where  
iVT and iTVσ are the mean and standard deviation of a firm’s trading volume from -250 to -101 days before the merger announcement. *, ** and *** show significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 6. Abnormal returns (%) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Full sample (N=783)  With rumours (N=340)  With FT coverage of 
announcement (N=245) 
 Without any FT 
coverage (N=198) 
 
3itFFAR  3. itFFARadj   3itFFAR  3. itFFARadj   3itFFAR   3itFFAR  
0 10.99*** 8.06***  8.52*** 1.44***  15.14***  10.10*** 
-1 2.32*** 5.30***  1.67*** 8.76***  3.49***  1.96*** 
-2 1.03*** 1.34***  1.33*** 2.10***  0.55***  1.11*** 
          
CAR(-10,-1) 6.29*** 8.22***  7.04*** 11.68***  6.91***  4.25*** 
CAR(-20,-11) 2.83*** 1.19**  4.33*** 0.35  1.20*  2.28** 
CAR(-30,-21) 1.84*** 0.89**  2.30*** -0.35  2.24***  0.57 
CAR(-40,-31) 0.66 0.56  0.86 0.76  0.33  0.74 
CAR(-50,-41) 1.45*** 1.13**  1.15 -0.96  1.54***  1.87** 
CAR(-60,-51) 0.83** 1.00*  0.42 0.21  0.67  1.72** 
CAR(-60,-1) 13.91*** 13.00***  16.09*** 11.69***  12.89***  11.43*** 
CAR(-60,-2) 11.60*** 7.70***  14.42*** 2.93**  9.40***  9.47*** 
Notes: This table shows the abnormal returns in relation to the merger announcement date (day 0). We show results for target firms (Columns 1 and 2), for firms with 
rumours (Columns 3 and 4), for firms with FT coverage of announcement (Column 5) and for firms without any FT coverage (Column 6). CAR shows the cumulative 
abnormal returns. 3itFFAR  shows the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted returns: )ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiititFF HMLbSMBbRbaRAR +++−= where tSMB  
and tHML  reflect the size and book/market risk proxies and iHMLiSMBiMi bbba ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  coefficients are estimated over the 150-day interval from -250 to -101 days. 
3itFFadjAR shows the abnormal returns in relation to the first rumour or, in case no rumours were reported, the merger announcement date. *, ** and *** show significance 
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 7. Abnormal trading volume (%) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Full sample (N=783)  With rumours (N=340)  With FT coverage of 
announcement (N=245) 
 Without any FT 
coverage (N=198) 
 
itATV  itATVAdj.   itATV  itATVAdj.   itATV   itATV  
0 5.01*** 2.82***  5.66*** 0.60***  5.85***  2.83*** 
-1 0.43*** 0.71***  0.38*** 1.07***  0.66***  0.20** 
-2 0.17*** 0.12***  0.31** 0.22**  0.04**  0.06** 
          
CATV(-10,-1) 1.45*** 1.43***  1.90*** 1.83***  1.30***  0.81*** 
CATV(-20,11) 0.97*** 0.80***  1.06*** 0.58***  0.87***  0.92*** 
CATV(-30,-21) 0.72*** 0.62***  0.83*** 0.62***  0.51***  0.78*** 
CATV(-40,-31) 0.80*** 0.54***  1.17*** 0.65***  0.40***  0.63*** 
CATV(-50,-41) 0.71*** 0.51***  0.86*** 0.46***  0.42***  0.80*** 
CATV(-60,-51) 0.66*** 0.56***  0.74*** 0.46**  0.57***  0.61*** 
CATV(-60,-1) 5.29*** 4.45***  6.56*** 4.60***  4.07***  4.55*** 
CATV(-60,-2) 4.87*** 3.73***  6.18*** 3.53***  3.41***  4.35*** 
Notes: This table shows the abnormal trading volume ( itETV ) in relation to the merger announcement date (day 0). We show results for target firms (Columns 1 and 2), for 
firms with rumours (Columns 3 and 4), for firms with FT coverage of announcement (Column 5) and for firms without any FT coverage (Column 6). CATV shows the 
cumulative abnormal trading volume. itATV  is estimated as follows: ATVit=TVit-( VT i+2 TViσ ) if VT i>2 TViσ  or 0 otherwise where  iVT and iTVσ are the mean and 
standard deviation of a firm’s trading volume from -250 to -101 days before the merger announcement. itadjATV  shows the abnormal trading volume in relation to the first 
rumour or, in case no rumours were reported, the merger announcement date. ** and *** show significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Table 8. Robustness tests (%) 
Panel 1: Abnormal returns that cannot be explained by rumours         
 Full sample Full sample Full sample /  
Sensitivity 
Full sample / 
Sign test 
Full sample / 
Portfolio method 
     
 
itRmARadj.  itCAPMARadj.  3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj       
CAR(-60,-1) 13.59*** 16.06*** 8.78*** 6.76*** 10.88***      
CAR(-60,-2) 7.50*** 9.97*** 3.79*** 5.20*** 4.86***      
           
 Basic material Consumer goods Consumer services Financials Health care Industrials Oil and gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
 
3. itFFARadj  
3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj
 
3. itFFARadj
 
3. itFFARadj
 
3. itFFARadj  3. itFFARadj
 
CAR(-60,-1) 18.06*** 15.14*** 9.78*** 6.73*** 15.04*** 18.80*** 12.79 12.90*** -3.38 5.51 
CAR(-60,-2) 10.21* 8.29** 4.49** 4.89** 7.52* 12.88*** 13.22 6.09* -7.03 3.39 
Panel 2: Abnormal trading volume that cannot be explained by rumours        
 Full sample  Full sample /  
Sensitivity 
        
 
ditSATVAdj tan.
 
itATVAdj.          
CATV(-60,-1) 1.29*** 3.47***         
CATV(-60,-2) 1.25*** 3.18***         
           
 Basic material Consumer goods Consumer services Financials Health care Industrials Oil and gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
 
itATVAdj.  
itATVAdj.  itATVAdj.  itATVAdj.  itATVAdj.  itATVAdj.
 
itATVAdj.
 
itATVAdj.
 
itATVAdj.  itATVAdj.
 
CATV(-60,-1) 8.11*** 5.66*** 6.60*** 3.13*** 3.96*** 4.82*** 7.63*** 5.01*** 4.91*** 6.10*** 
CATV(-60,-2) 6.95*** 5.24*** 6.02*** 2.96*** 3.80*** 4.39*** 7.58*** 4.57*** 4.89*** 5.91*** 
Notes: This table shows the robustness of abnormal returns (Panel 1) and trading volume (Panel 2) that cannot be explained by rumours. itRmARadj. , itCAPMARadj. and 
3. itFFARadj  show abnormal returns above the corresponding market performance, CAPM model’s risk-adjusted performance and the three-factor model’s risk-adjusted 
returns. ditSATVAdj tan. shows abnormal trading volume according to which we divide each firm’s abnormal trading volume by the standard deviation of its trading volume 
between -250 and -101 days. Sensitivity column shows results when excluding the top 5 percent of the firms with the highest abnormal returns/trading volume before merger 
announcements. Sign test is a non-parametric test estimated as  J1=(N+/N-0.5)*N1/2/0.5 where N+ is the number of returns with positive abnormal returns and N the total 
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number of returns. In line with the portfolio method (e.g., Jaffe, 1974), we first estimate the monthly standardised average abnormal returns adjusted by prior month’s 
standard deviation and then calculate the average of the cumulative standardised values.  *, ** and *** show significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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 Table 9. Interaction between abnormal returns and trading volume 
Panel 1: Single-equation results        
 (-60,-1) (-100,-61)  (-60,-1) (-100,-61)  (-60,-1) (-100,-61) 
 Fixed Fixed  Random Random  First difference First difference 
Constant    0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.009*** 
(0.000) 
   
itATV  0.652*** (0.000) 
0.383* 
(0.071) 
 0.626*** 
(0.000) 
0.368* 
(0.076) 
 0.576*** 
(0.000) 
0.241 
(0.271) 
         
# 43043 28648  43043 28648  39835 26316 
Hausman test     22.716*** 
(0.000) 
0.126 
(0.723) 
   
Panel 2: Multivariate results       
 (-60,-1) (-100,-61)       
  Fixed Fixed       
itATV  0.430*** (0.000) 
0.434 
(0.217) 
      
iti ATVRumour *  0.281*** (0.000) 
-1.006** 
(0.039) 
      
itLnSize  0.044*** (0.000) 
0.060*** 
(0.009) 
      
itBM  -0.004*** (0.000) 
-0.030** 
(0.024) 
      
         
#  32165 21322       
F statistic 3.331*** 
(0.000) 
1.241*** 
(0.000) 
      
Notes: This table explores the interaction between abnormal returns and trading volume. Panel 1 follows a Panel estimation that explores the single-equation relation between 
contemporaneous abnormal returns and trading volume when using fixed effects, random effects and the first difference method. We then estimate the following Panel 
estimation with fixed effects (Hausman test is significant at the 1 percent level): ititititiititFF uBMbSizebATVRumourbATVbbAR +++++= 432103 ln* where 
3itFFAR  is the three-factor risk-adjusted returns as estimated in equation (1), itATV  is the abnormal trading volume as estimated by equation (2), iRumour  is a dummy 
variable coded 1 for firms with rumours, itLnSize is the log market capitalisation and itBM  is the book-to-market. # indicates the number of observations used. The interval 
between  (-60,-1) indicates the target price run-ups, and (-100,-61) is used as a control period. 0 indicates the merger announcement day. *, ** and *** show significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels.  
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Figure 1. Prior to merger cumulative abnormal returns of target firms ( 3itFFAR ) 
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Notes: This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of target firms prior to the merger announcement (day 0). Abnormal returns on the day of the merger are not shown 
in the figure. 3itFFAR is estimated as follows: )ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiititFF HMLbSMBbRbaRAR +++−= where tSMB  and tHML  reflect the size and 
book/market risk proxies and iHMLiSMBiMi bbba ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  coefficients are estimated over the 150-day interval from -250 to -101 days.  
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Figure 2. Abnormal returns - annual analysis (%) 
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Notes: This figure shows the average daily abnormal returns of target firms in the interval between -60 and -1 (merger announcement day, 0) during the sample period. 
Abnormal returns are the three-factor model adjusted returns and are estimated as follows: )ˆˆˆˆ(3 tiHMLtiSMBMtiMiititFF HMLbSMBbRbaRAR +++−= where 
tSMB  and tHML  reflect the size and book/market risk proxies and iHMLiSMBiMi bbba
ˆ,ˆ,ˆ,ˆ  coefficients are estimated over the 150-day interval from -250 to -101 days. 
Returns shown are those unexplained from FT rumours.   
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Figure 3. Abnormal trading volume - annual analysis (%) 
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Notes: This figure shows the average daily abnormal trading volume of target firms in the interval between -60 and -1 (merger announcement day, 0) during the sample 
period. Abnormal trading volume is estimated as follows: ATVit=TVit-( VT i+2 TViσ ) if VT i>2 TViσ  or 0 otherwise where  iVT and iTVσ are the mean and standard 
deviation of a firm’s trading volume from -250 to -101 days before the merger announcement. Trading volume shown is that unexplained from FT rumours.   
 
 
 
 
